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UNAESTHETIC SIGHTS AS NUISANCES
Dix W. NOEL
When a landowner in a pleasant locality decides to use his property for the
operation of an automobile wrecking establishment, as a vantage point from
which to display a striking illuminated advertisement, or for some other
purpose considered unsightly by persons living nearby, there often arises the
question of whether any legal wrong has been committed. The answer,
assuming that there has been no violation of zoning or building restrictions,
depends on whether or not the use of the property complained of constitutes
a sufficient annoyance to be characterized as a "nuisance". This term does
not lend itself to precise definition,1 but frequently it is used to characterize
activity on land which constitutes a more or less permanent interference with
the comfortable enjoyment of neighboring property. 2 The term will be
employed in this sense in connection with the present topic of unaesthetic
sights.
In the development of the law of nuisances aesthetic interests usually have
been treated with slight regard, as a matter of luxury and indulgence.3 The
tendency has been to refuse to enjoin a condition, or to allow damages, unless
the annoyance complained of causes some tangible discomfort as distinguished
from that which depends on taste or imagination. For example, in the case
of Hotston Gca. and Fuel Company v. Harlow4 the jury found that the
erection- of a large gas tank near the residence of the plaintiff had resulted
in the depreciation of the market value of the plaintiff's property to the extent
of two thousand dollars, and that fifty percent of the depreciation was due
not to any danger, or odor, but solely to the unsightliness of the tank. Judg'See Melker v. New York, 190 N. Y. 481, 487-88, 83 N. E. 565, 567 (1908); JoycE,
NUISANCES
(1906) § 1; HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 179.
2

See Baltimore & P. R. R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U. S. 317, 329, 2 Sup. Ct. 719,
726 (1883) ; HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 181. For general definitions of the various meanings of the term "nuisance" see JoycE, NUISANCES (1906) §§ 2, 11; 1 WooD, NUISANCES
(3d ed. 1893) § 1; HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 179.
""Mere aesthetics is beyond the power of the court to regulate." Perry Mount Park
Cemetery Ass'n v. Netzal, 274 Mich. 97, 99, 264 N. W. 303 (1936) refusing to enjoin
undertaking establishment. See also Wescott v. Middleton, 43 N. J. Eq. 478, 483, 11
Atl. 490, 493 (1887) refusing to enjoin undertaking establishment, where the court
says: "It is not within the judicial scheme of things to make things pleasant for all the
citizens of the State."

'297 S.W. 570 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
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ment was rendered for the entire damage, but on appeal the amount was
reduced to one thousand dollars, the court stating:
"It seems wholly illogical to hold that, while the unsightliness of the
building, which only affronts the artistic taste of the adjacent property
owners, would not entitle the appellee to recover damages for any annoyance thereby caused him, such annoyance may be considered as an
element of damage .... 5
This decision is representative of a general disposition of the courts to consider that mere unsightliness is not an actionable wrong, even though there
may have been a substantial depreciation in the value of adjacent property.6
There is some indication, however, of "a growing belief that that which
is offensive to the view, an eyesore, a landscape blight, may attain such significance as to warrant equitable interposition". 7 It has long been established

that sights offensive to a sense of decency may-be enjoined, 8 and it is submitted
that the interest in freedom from unsightly conditions as well now has become of sufficient importance to receive some degree of protection. While
the courts no doubt will continue in most cases to favor economic uses of
land as opposed to aesthetic interests it seems likely, now that the earlier
need of the country for rapid economic expansion is less pressing, that there
will be a disposition in some situations to grant relief against unsightliness
alone. It is submitted that courts desiring to take this course can find considerable support in the general principles of the law of nuisances, in several
lines of decisions in which aesthetic considerations have at least implicitly
been given weight, and in a few judicial declarations expressly recognizing
that an unaesthetic sight may amount to a legal wrong.
I
The case in which the question of aesthetic interests has, perhaps, been
most carefully considered is that of ParkersburgBuilders Material Company
et al. v. Barrack,9 decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Vir"Id. at 572.
"Northfield v. Board of Freeholders et al., 85 N. J.Eq. 47, 95 Atl. 745 (1915) ; Rea
et ux. v. Tacoma Mausoleum Ass'n, 103 Wash. 429, 174 Pac. 961, 1 A. L. R. 541
(1918) refusing to enjoin mausoleum immediately adjoining residential property; Zey
et ux. v. Long Beach, 144 Wash. 582, 258 Pac. 492, 55 A. L. R. 470 (1927) refusing to
enjoin comfort station for unsightliness alone. See also 1 WooD, NUISANCEs (3d ed.

§ 3.
1893)
7

See Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W. Va. 608, 612, 191 S. E.

368, 370, 110 A. L. R. 1454, 1457 (1937).

OCranford et al. v. Tyrell, 128 N. Y. 341, 28 N. E. 514 (1891) injunctior against
house of ill-fame as private nuisance, mainly on account of indecent sights; Farrell v.
Cook, 16 Neb. 483, 20 N. W. 720 (1884) and Hayden v. Tucker, 37 Mo. 214 (1886)
injunctions against use of land for standing stallions to mares in view of dwelling house.
0118 W. Va. 608, 191 S.E. 368 and 192 S.E. 291, 110 A. L. R. 1454 (1937), commented on in Note, The Modern Tendency toward the Protection of the Aesthetic (1937)
44 W. VA. L. Q. 58-61.
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ginia in 1937, involving a suit to enjoin the use of land, enclosed by a wire
fence seven or eight feet high, for the outdoor storage and wreckage of
abandoned automobiles. The neighborhood was claimed to be essentially
residential. In the circuit court the trial chancellor enjoined the defendant
from continuing to use his property for the storage or dismantling of old
cars except within an enclosed structure, and required that the wire fence
be taken down. On appeal the decision was reversed by the Supreme Court,
but solely on the ground that the neighborhood had not been proved to be
residential. The opinion, written by Judge Maxwell, is devoted principally
to the support of the court's conclusion that it would have enjoined a condition such as this, on grounds of unsightliness alone, if the area had in fact
been residential. It is stated:
"Happily, the day has arrived when persons may entertain appreciation
of the aesthetic and be heard in equity in vindication of their love of the
beautiful, without becoming objects of opprobium. Basically, this is
because a thing visually offensive may seriously affect the residents of a
community in the reasonable enjoyment of their homes, and may produce
a decided reduction in property values. Courts must not be indifferent
to the truth that within essential limitations aesthetics has a proper place
in the community affairs of modern society."' 10
After a reference to the defendant's business as "honorable and useful" the
court adds:
"But an outdoor lay-out of a business of that kind necessarily is not
pleasing to the view. Such business, therefore, should not be located
in a community of unquestioned residential character.""
In a concurring opinion in Material Company v. Barrack, the President
of the court, Judge Kenna, sharply dissents from the conclusions of the
other judges as to their power to enjoin the continuance of structure or condition on grounds of unsightliness alone. He asserts that the court's dictum
.on this point represents an unwarranted extension of the law of nuisances,
and will give rise to great difficulties in attempting to create a standard by
which to determine what is in fact sufficiently unsightly to be subject to injunction. Thus he says:
"The rules that govern the law of nuisances are uncertain enough
without engrafting upon them a doctrine as essentially speculative as
this dictum. With that doctrine as a part of our equity jurisprudence,
our courts are likely to be called upon in a large degree to embark in the
business of city planning, with little12 to guide them except the infinite
variations of taste and preference."'
-118 W. Va. 608, 612-13, 191 S. E. 368, 371.
1118 W. Va. 608, 613, 191 S. E. 368, 371.
-118 W. Va. 608, 618, 192 S. E. 291, 293.
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This difficulty of establishing an objective standard, assuming that aesthetic
considerations in a given case are of sufficient importance to receive protection at the cost of restricting economic uses of land, doubtless creates a
problem, but is the difficulty insuperable? Will the courts in fact be obliged
to become arbiters of taste in a field where there are "infinite variations of
taste and preference"? It is not suggested by the majority in Material Company v. Barrack that courts enjoin every structure, such as a house of peculiar
architecture, which may be considered unaesthetic by neighbors or by the
court. It is stated, rather, that an injunction should be granted "only where
there is presented a situation which is offensive to the view of the average
persons in the community". 13 That there is no intent to empower the courts
to establish an arbitrary aesthetic standard is indicated by a quotation from a
decision sustaining a zoning ordinance, in which was stated by Justice Owen
of Wisconsin:
"The rights of property should not be sacrificed to the pleasure of an
ultra-aesthetic taste. But whether they should be permitted to plague the
average or dominant human sensibilities, may well be pondered."'14
It would seem that the method of determining what constitutes an eyesore
could be the same as that employed generally in deciding what amounts to a
sufficient interference with comfort to constitute a nuisance. In general,
conditions are gauged "not merely according to elegant and dainty modes and
habits of living, but according to the plain and sober and simple notions
among the people". 15 The test ordinarily applied is "the judgment of reasonable men", and the standard is the "normal" man.16 No doubt the process of
determining the sentiments of the average man as to aesthetic matters would
be in some cases very difficult; but in a case where a junk yard, a comfort
station, a large mausoleum, or gas tank is erected next to a residence, probably it is not impracticable to ascertain the average man's reaction even though
no interference with his physical comfort is involved, particularly if the unsightliness of the adjacent structure has led to a sharp depreciation in the
market value of the property. In cases of this type, should it not be left for
determination by the court or jury in each particular instance whether the
condition complained of is such as to interfere with the comfort of a person
of ordinary sensibilities, even though it is offensive only to sight?
It is well established that a condition offensive to the sense of hearing alone
-118 W. Va. 608, 613, 191 S. E. 368, 371.
'State ex. -el. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 159, 196 N. W. 451, 455 (1923).
'See Miller et. al. v. Jersey Coast Resorts Corp., 98 N. J.Eq. 289, 300, 130 At.

824, 829 (1925) apparently roughly quoting from Walter v. Selfe, 4 De. G. & Sm. 315,
322, 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 15, 22 (1851) where the court refers to the "plain and sober and
simple notions among the English people".
"JOYCE, NUISANCES (1906) § 20.
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may constitute a nuisance,' 7 and likewise offensive odors often have been
held subject to injunction.' 8 In these cases it has been possible for a court
or jury to determine whether the noise or odor was sufficient to disturb the
comfort of an ordinary person, although the same difficulties in fixing an objective standard as those encountered in the case of an eyesore may be
present. 10 It has been suggested that in situations involving noises and odors
the courts in fact have been protecting an aesthetic interest, inasmuch as the
appreciation of beauty embraces the senses of hearing and smell as well as
sight.2 0 This observation seems valid in so far as relief against noise and
odors has been granted upon grounds of mental disturbance as distinguished
from interference with sleep and injury to health.-' To the extent that decisions involving noise or odors are based on the physical invasion of the
atmosphere, there does not seem to be a similar basis for holding a condition
offensive only to sight a nuisance, although in the cases where the annoyance
2
is from reflected light there is a transfer of physical energy involved.2 But
from a practical standpoint, might not the sight of a large gas tank, automobile wrecking establishment, or comfort station be as disturbing to the
comfort of a normal individual as the odors from a stable, or the noise from
a talking machine or a jazz band? No doubt in the case of offensive sights,
as in the law of nuisance generally, it would be essential to consider the
character of the environment, 23 and ordinarily there would be no possibility
of relief except in a residential neighborhood. And it would seem that the
practice of some courts of balancing interests to decide whether the complainant shall have an injunction or only damages, 24 would be particularly
1
7Meadowbrook Swimming Club, Inc. v. Albert et al., 173 Md. 641, 197 Atl. 146 (1938)
enjoining loud jazz music; Stodder et al. v. Rosen Talking Machine Co., 241 Mass. 245,
135 N. E. 251 (1922) ; see also 3 CooLEY, ToRTs (4th ed. Haggard 1932) § 430.
'Houghton et al. v. Kenrick, 285 Pa. 223, 132 Atl. 166 (1926) enjoining livery stable;
Pruner & Hubbles v. Pendleton et al., 75 Va. 516, 40 Am. Rep. 738 (1881) enjoining
slaughterhouse. See also State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 159, 196 N. W.
451, 455 (1923) ; and 3 COOLEY, ToRTs (4th ed. Haggard 1932) § 433.
"Cf. Miller et al. v. Jersey Coast Resorts, 98 N. J. Eq. 289, 299, 130 Atl. 824, 828
(1925) where Berry, V. C., says: "Nor can I say how many popular songs may be sung
in a private residence of an evening or how much music or what kind may be produced
-there, or whether those songs must be rendered in English or Yiddish. . . . I do not
mean to intimate that excessive noise ... could not be restrained by the court."
'See note, Injunction against "Sight" Nuisance (1936) 2 U. OF PITT. L. RaV.
191, 192.
'In Seligman v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 71 N. J. Eq. 697, 63 Atl. 1093 (1906)
the operation of a factory at night was enjoined expressly on the ground that it disturbed sleep, but in Stodder et al. v. Rosen Talking Machine Co., 241 Mass. 245, 135 N. E.
251 (1922) the operation of a talking machine during the day was enjoined.
=See (1929) 28 Mich. L. Rev. 211 and Shepler v. Kansas Milling Co., 128 Kans. 554,
278 Pac. 757 (1929), cited infra note 58.
3Eller v. Koehler, 68 Ohio St. 51, 67 N. E. 89 (1903) ; St. Helen's Smelting Co. v.
Tipping, 11 H. L. Cas. 642 (1865) per Lord Westbury; 1 WooD, NUISANCEs (3d ed.
1893) § 9.
!"Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105 (1868); Madison v. Duck Sulphur Copper and Iron
Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S. W. 658 (1904); see CLARx, EQUITY (1919) § 215.
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appropriate where some useful enterprise was objected to as offensive only
to sight.

Ii
The only case directly in point which the court in Material Company v.
Barrack cited in support of its dictum was Yeager v. Traylor,25 decided by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1932. There the defendant proposed
to construct at the rear of an apartment hotel in a residential area a garage
to be used as a parking place by hotel *patrons and tenants. The building was
to have- concrete floors with steel supports, and a ramp leading to the roof,
which also was to be used for parking cars. The sides of the structure were
to be almost entirely unenclosed. The lower court enjoined the construction
of the building, claiming that it would be a nuisance per se on account of
noises, gas, and vapors arising from the cars. In modifying this decree to
permit the erection of a garage for permanent tenants, the Supreme Court
laid down various restrictions, some of which appear to be based on aesthetic
considerations alone. Thus it is stated:
"The proposed building, in the case before us, if erected, must be enclosed entirely and conform in architectural design to the building to
which it is attached. Ramps and other devices having a tendency to disturb the peace and quiet of the neighborhood must be avoided, and all
means for raising and lowering the cars must be within the walls of
the building. If it is proposed to supply the parking space upon the
roof, an effective screen must be provided by means of a suitable balustrade or other device to hide the unsightly appearance which would be
the result of such practice .... The decree of the court below is modified

to the extent herein indicated for the erection of a garage of modern
construction, of suitable and proper proportions, and architecture such
as will be in keeping with the general character of the community... "26
The above requirements as to the conformity of the design of the garage
to that of the hotel and as to the screen "to hide the unsightly appearance"
which would result from parking cars on the roof, seem to be based on considerations of appearance only. The same may be said of the court's directions
that the garage be of proper proportions, and that the architecture be in
keeping with the expensive character of the community.
III
In addition to Material Company v. Barrack there are a few other cases,
for the most part in the lower courts, in which junk yards and automobile
wrecking establishments have been complained of as nuisances. In Weishahn
'306 Pa. 530, 160 AtI. 108 (1932).
"306 Pa. 530, 535, 160 AtI. 108, 109 (1932).
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v. Kemper et al.2 7 the use of property in a residential neighborhood for the
storage of junk was enjoined. There the defendants had built up a large
business with five men engaged daily in unloading trucks and re-loading the
junk after it had been cut and broken by electric shears. The injunction
seems to have been based principally on the presence of noise and dust; but
that the court also had considerations of unsightliness in mind is suggested
by a reference to the fact that at times the entire yard was filled with junk
"piled higher than the fence". In another Ohio case 28 the court enjoined the
operation of a junk yard, but there the decision was based mainly on an
ordinance prohibiting this business within the city limits. The court held
the ordinance to be a proper exercise of the police power as applied to a
junk yard directly opposite residential property, 29 stating that the permitting
of junk of any kind in any considerable quantity to accumulate and remain
upon the lot in question beyond a reasonable time, as well as the burning
and cutting, was "inconsistent with the health, peace and safety of plaintiff
and the adjacent community". 0
There are also two lower court decisions in Pennsylvania enjoining junk
yards in residential districts. In the first of these,8 1 the injunction was
granted principally because of the likelihood of fumes, stagnant water breeding insects, and noises from the operation of electric shears; but the court
also refers to the fact that junk, piled at times to a height of five feet, "will
cut off the view of residents to the rear of their properties". The other
Pennsylvania decision is a recent one8 2 in which the nature of the yard is not
described, the court taking judicial notice of what constitutes an "automobile
graveyard". That aesthetic considerations played an important part in this decision is indicated by the court's overruling of an objection to the introduction
of testimony designed only to establish unsightliness. The case of Material
Company v. Barrack is distinguished, as to its actual holding, by a finding
that the City of Lancaster, in which the "automobile graveyard" was
located, was quasi-residential throughout, no attempt being made to distinguish the decision of the West Virginia court by showing the presence of
objectionable elements in addition to unsightliness. It must be conceded,
however, that in so far as the decisions of courts of last resort are concerned,
there is no tendency to find that automobile wrecking establishments constitute nuisances on grounds of unsightliness alone. In addition to the actual
holding in Material Company v. Barrack, there is a decision by the Supreme
-32 Ohio App. 313, 167 N. E. 468 (1928).
'Grundstein v. Ashland, 25 Ohio N. P. N. S. 493 (1925).
'IThe court refused, however, to enforce the ordinance as applied to a lot 200 ft. further
removed, and surrounded by industrial property.
025 Ohio N. P. N. S. 493, 505.
aMorgan et al. v. Zuckerman et al., 49 YoRx LEGAL REcoRD 13 (1935).
uRebman et al. v. Murray et al., 29 MuN. L. REP. 165 (Pa. Com. P. 1938).
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Court of Michigan 3 refusing to enjoin the operation of such a wrecking
establishment situated across the highway from a cemetery. In the course
of the opinion the court observed:
"Defendant's plant may be unsightly and detract somewhat from the
beauty of the view from the cemetery, but mere aesthetics is beyond the
power of the court to regulate, especially
in a case like this where both
'34
parties are in business for profit.
Some of the language of the court indicates that the decision might have
been otherwise if the neighborhood had been residential.3 5
IV
In one class of cases there is a definite tendency to grant an injunction or
allow damages on account of an enterprise objectionable only to sight and to
subjective sensibilities-the cases involving undertaking establishments in
residential districts. Occasionally, the courts refuse to declare such an
establishment a nuisance in the absence of some tangible physical annoyance,
such as odors from chemicals used in embalming, noises from telephones,
ambulances, doorbells, and the frequent conduct of funeral services, or disturbance from traffic congestion, or danger of contagion ;36 but during recent
years the emphasis in these cases has shifted in many jurisdictions to other
grounds. It frequently has been held that such an establishment may be enjoined simply because the sight of caskets, hearses, flowers, and undertaker's
37
signs presents a constant reminder of death, leading to mental depression.
Thus in Street v. Marshall, a case involving a "funeral home" with no embalming done on the premises and consequently no odor nor danger of contagion, in answer to a contention that the establishment must be such as to
affect directly health or grossly offend physical senses it is said:
"This position is without support in the decided cases. While it is
true that in many, if not all of them, the charge was made that the
establishment complained of would communicate contagion, and would
emit noxious gases, and offensive smells, such charge was almost universally found to be without substantial support in the evidence. A
'Perry Mount Park Cemetery Ass'n v. Netzal, 274 Mich. 97, 264 N. W. 303 (1936).
'274 Mich. 97, 99, 264 N. W. 303 (1936).

"In this connection the court stated: "A cemetery is not the most desirable neighbor,
neither is defendant's wrecking plant, and, therefore, when the owner of the one complains of the undesirableness of the other, this fact should be kept in mind." 274 Mich.
97, 99, 266 N. W. 303 (1936).
='Pearson & Son et al. v. Bonnie et al., 209 Ky. 307, 272 S. W. 375, 43 A. L. R. 1166
(1925) ; Westcott v. Middleton, 43 N. J. Eq. 478, 11 Ati. 490 (1887) ; Stoddard et al.
v. Snodgrass et al., 117 Ore. 262, 241 Pac. 73, 43 A. L. R. 1160 (1925).
'Saier v. Joy, 198 Mich. 295, 164 N.'W. 507 (1917) ; Williams et al. v. Montgomery,
186 So. 302 (Miss. 1939) ; Tureman v. Kettlerin, 304 Mo. 221, 263 S. W. 202, 43 A. L. R.
1155 (1924) ; Street et al. v. Marshall et al., 316 Mo. 698, 263 S. W. 494 (1927) ; Beisel
et al. v. Crosby, 104 Neb. 643, 178 N. W. 272 (1920).
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careful reading of these cases will disclose that what has been stressed
and in the last analysis made the basis of injunctive relief is this: Constant reminders of death, such as an undertaking establishment and the
activities connected with it give rise to, im-pair im,a substantialway the
comfort, repose, and enjoyment of the homes which are subjected to
them."s3
In most of the cases cited by the court in support of the above statement the
decision is based in part upon some actual evidence of odors, noises, congestion, and the like, but in several there is no doubt but that the consideration of mental discomfort has predominated, 39 and in one case the decision,
as in Street v. Marshall, seems to be based upon this consideration alone. 40
In almost all of these cases there has been evidence of depreciation of the
market value of the nearby property.
While it is clear that in some of the decisions involving undertakers' establishments the court is enjoining a use of property offensive only to sight, it
should perhaps be added that the courts do not generally regard the mental
depression resulting from the constant reminder of death primarily as an
"aesthetic" consideration. There are frequent references to evidence that the
constant reminder of the physical aspects of death is detrimental to health,
or judicial notice is taken of this as a clear fact. 41 In so far, however, as
these decisions also emphasize mere loss of enjoyment 42 this seems to be a
situation where weight is in effect being given to aesthetic considerations. In
this situation perhaps there is not the same difficulty in establishing an objective standard as in the case of a condition presenting an ugly or incongruous appearance. Although occasionally it is said that many would insist
that the suggestion of death "would, in the end, be a salutary influence", 43 it
seems more likely as stated in Street v.Marshall that death is "one thing
from which the normal individual instinctively flees, whatever his religion or
philosophy of life", 44 at least as regards its physical aspects. It is no doubt
1316 Mo. 698, 705-06, 291 S.W. 494, 497 (1927).
'See decisions cited supra note 37.
' 0 Tureman v. Kettlerin, 304 Mo. 221, 263 S.W. 202, 43 A. L. R. 1155 (1924).
'Thus in the recent case of Williams et al. v. Montgomery, 186 So. 302, 305 (Miss.
1939) the court says: "It is psychological that a person who lives in a depressed itmosphere will normally be depressed in spirit and sensibility, and will be weakened in
power to resist the vicissitudes of life, including disease." See also the other decisions
cited supra note 37.
"-See Williams v. Montgomery, 186 So. 302, 303 (Miss. 1939); Street v. Marshall,
316 Mo. 698, 709, 291 S.W. 494, 499 (1927) ; Beisel et al. v. Crosby, 104 Neb. 643, 646,
178 N. W. 272, 273 (1920). It seems clear that persons of normal disposition will lose
their happy demeanor when a funeral passes, from either sympathy or dread, although
occasionally there is testimony such as "that the living observer of a passing funeral
would, or might, be buoyed up by the thought that another, and not he, was on the way
to the cemetery". Street v. Marshall, 316 Mo. 698, 704, 291 S.W. 494, 496 (1927).
"OSee Rea et ux. v. Tacoma Mausoleum Ass'n, 103 Wash. 429, 433, 174 Pac. 961,
962 (1918) quoting from Ellison v. Washington, 58 N. C. 57, 75 Am. Dec. 630 (1859).
"1316 Mo. 698, 709, 291 S.W. 496, 499 (1927).
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true, as suggested by one judge, 45 that we are surrounded from the cradle
to the grave with reminders of mortality "which the contemplative mind cannot escape having recalled to him by the falling leaf, November wind, and the
newspaper accounts of Sunday accidents-all beyond remedy by injunction--"; but most minds are not contemplative, and most' reminders of death
do not affect a man of ordinary sensibilities to the same extent as does the
constant presence of an undertaking establishment.
Another example of how a condition disturbing to sight and mental
quietude only may constitute a nuisance is furnished by the case of Everett
et al. v. Paschall." There the use of a cottage in a residential area as a tuberculosis sanitarium was enjoined, notwithstanding a finding of the lower court,
which denied relief, that in fact there was no danger of contagion. The
reversal by the upper court was on the ground that since the fear of contagion was sufficiently real to depreciate sharply the value of adjacent property, 47 it must be held that the sanitarium disturbed the comfortable enjoyment of that property. The court gives a definition of comfort which
indicates a conception of the term extending beyond tangible physical considerations. It states that comfortable enjoyment means "mental quiet as
well as physical comfort", that comfort "implies some degree of positive
animation of spirits, or some pleasurable sensations derived from happy and
agreeable prospects", and whatever is requisite to furnish "reasonable physical, mental, and spiritual enjoyment". 4 The holding of this case was reaffirmed in Ferry v. Seattle,49 where in the course of an opinion enjoining
the construction of a reservoir separated from the plaintiff's property by a
fifty-six foot embankment, on the grounds that apprehension of danger by
a great number of persons would be caused, the court cited Everett v. Paschall stating:

"It was there held that, though the fear of disease might be unfounded, imaginary, and fanciful, yet, where there is a positive dread
which science has not yet been able to eliminate, such dread, robbing as
it did the home owner of the pleasure in and comfortable enjoyment of
his home, would make the thing dreaded an actionable nuisance, and the
depreciation of the property consequent thereon would warrant a decree
against its continuance." 50
It may be said that the interest protected in Everett v. Paschall-aground' 5Eschweiler, J., dissenting in Cunningham v. Muller, 178 Wis. 22, 33, 189 N. W. 531,
535 (1922).
'*61Wash. 47, 111 Pac. 879, 31 L. R. A. (N.s.) 827 (1910).
'It was found by the lower court that plaintiff's property would be lessened in value
33 1/3% to 50% by reason of the presence of the sanitarium.
"61 Wash. 47, 51-52, 111 Pac. 879, 880-81, quoting from Forman v. Whitney, 2 Keyes
165, 168 (N. Y. 1865).
"116 Wash. 648, 203 Pac. 40 (1921).
50116 Wash. 648, 664, 203 Pac. 40, 41 (1921).
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less fear of injury to health-is more effective to destroy the comfortable
enjoyment of neighboring property than a sight which is merely ugly or discordant, but at least the decision shows a tendency to extend the concept of
comfort to merely mental disturbance at the sight of an object not in fact
causing any physical danger. 51
V
In the situation where a landowner has acted maliciously, conditions of
a merely unsightly nature frequently have been enjoined. Thus the modern
tendency is to hold that where a high fence has been erected for the sole
purpose of cutting off a neighbor's view, or interfering with his access to
light and air, the fence constitutes a nuisance. 52 It has been stated in connection with cases of this type that the malicious intent must so predominate
as a motive as to give character to the structure, and that it must be manifest
that the real usefulness of the structure will be subordinate and incidental. 53
But notvithstanding the emphasis on the necessity of a purely malicious
motive, there is an implication in these decisions that the fence in itself interferes to a material extent with the comfortable enjoyment of neighboring
property. A structure of harmless character, such as a house of a style of
architecture known to be distasteful to a neighbor, and complained of on the
ground that it was erected for purposes of annoyance, could hardly be enjoined. The older authorities, 54. refusing to enjoin a spite fence, would seem
to be correct unless it can be assumed that an unsightly structure of this
kind does in fact interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of adjacent
property. This point is illustrated by the dissenting opinions in Brush v.
Mockett, where Reese, C. J., says, "It does not strike me that the fence was
so unsightly as to shock the sensibilities of anyone, however refined they
may be", and Letton, J., states,
USee, however, Northfield v. Board of Freeholders, 85 N. J. Eq. 47, 95 Atl. 745
(1915) where the New Jersey court refused to enjoin a tuberculosis hospital because
there was no tangible or material injury to adjoining property. And in Stotler v.
Rochelle, 83 Kan. 86, 91, 109 Pac. 788, 790 (1910) an injunction against a cancer hospital was granted only because surrounding property owners had "reasonable grounds"
to fear infection. There is a similar conflict of opinion as to an insane asylum in a
residential district. See Barth et aL. v. Psychopathic Hospital, 196 Mich. 642, 163 N.
W. 62 (1917) granting an injunction, partly because plaintiff would be "annoyed and
inconvenienced by the sight of such an institution", and Heaton et aL. v. Packer et al.,
131 App. Div. 812, 116 N. Y. Supp. 46 (1st Dep't 1909) refusing to grant an injunction.
OBurke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N. W. 838 (1888) ; Brush v. Mockett, 95 Neb.
552, 145 N. W. 1001 (1914); Barger v. Barrington, 151 N. C. 433, 66 S. E" 439, 25
L. R. A. (N.s.) 831 (1909) ; 1 CooLEY, ToRTs (4th ed. Haggard 1932) § 56; HARPER,
TORTS (1933) § 187; 11 R. C. L. 877-78.
'Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N. E. 390 (1889) ; Holbrook v. Morrison, 214

209, 100 N. E. 1111, 44 L. R. A. (N.s.) 228 (1913).
Mass.
5
1Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73, 42 N. E. 765, 40 L. R. A. 177 (1896). See Falloon
v. Schilling, 29 Kan. 292, 44 Am. Rep. 642 (1883).
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"While I agree with the modern doctrine, I think the motive is not
material, unless the structure is offensive, unsightly, or is built for no
useful purpose. If the fence was lawful, proper, and not unsightly, the
courts should not interfere.' 55
Logically, therefore, the modern decisions which declare that a spite fence
constitutes a nuisance are a further indication of a tendency to protect against
unaesthetic sights.
VI
There are a few special situations where conditions offensive to sight
alone have been enjoined, primarily on grounds of interference with rest and
physical comfort, but where aesthetic considerations also may well have been
a factor. In one of these cases, The Shelburne, Inc. v. Crosson Corp. et al.,5 6
the complainant operated a large hotel in Atlantic City, on the boardwalk.
The lessee of the defendant had erected on the roof of an apartment house
adjoining the hotel an electric sign sixty-six feet high and seventy-two feet
long, holding 1,084 fifteen-watt colored lights. At night the light from this
sign shone directly into some of the bedrooms of the complainant's hotel, disturbing the guests. There were other signs along the boardwalk but the
others did not project light directly into bedrooms. Inside the hotel a dance
orchestra played until midnight, so near the rooms in question as to disturb
the guests. The complainant sought to enjoin the operation of the sign at
night. It was held that operation after midnight, but not before, would be
enjoined. The court considered that in so far as the sign disturbed sleep,
after the orchestra had ceased, it interfered "with the ordinary comfort,
physically, of human existence". No express reference was made to aesthetic
considerations, but allusions by the court to the varied colors of the lights
and the famous quality of the hotels along the boardwalk suggest that such
considerations may in fact have played a part in the decision.
In a somewhat similar case 57 the defendant, while erecting a building
adjacent to that of the plaintiff at a distance of four feet, maintained a row
of nitrogen lights at a point directly opposite the bedroom of the plaintiff.
The lights were turned on at midnight almost every night, and the rest of
the plaintiff was seriously disturbed. The court held that these lights had
constituted a nuisance, and awarded damages, stating that this use of property
by the defendant was unreasonable. In this case also the court made no
reference to aesthetic considerations, but the decision furnishes another
example of how a condition offensive to sight alone may constitute a nuisance, even though the physical injury involved perhaps could have been
-95 Neb. 552, 559-60, 145 N. W. 1001, 1003-04 (1914).
.195 N. J. Eq. 188, 122 Atl. 749 (1923).
"Nugent et aL. v. Melville Shoe Corp. et aL., 280 Mass. 469, 182 N. E. 825 (1932).
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averted by a shade or some other device. Where, however, mere light from
defendant's premises does not disturb sleep, it seems doubtful that there is
any nuisance involved. In the unusual case of Shepler v. Kansas Milling
Co.58 a battery of grain storage tanks sixty feet in height and painted white
had been erected opposite the residence of the plaintiff. These tanks reflected
the rays of the afternoon sun to the front porch of the residence, to the
"great annoyance and discomfort" of the plaintiff. The court considered this
to be dammon, absque injuria and declined to allow damages, rejecting as
fanciful the notion that a milling company could be controlled as to the
height or color of its tanks simply because they "might offend the sensibilities
of plaintiff in the exercise and enjoyment of his front porch on a sunny
afternoon 1"
VII
A precedent heavily relied upon by the court in Material Company v. Barrack to support its dictum that things offensive to sight alone may constitute
a nuisance was the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.59 sustaining the constitutionality of a zoning
ordinance designed to establish exclusive residential districts. This decision
was cited as indicative of a tendency to recognize "the right and duty of
society to protect itself from undesirable and disagreeable conditions". Additional decisions, particularly those permitting the elimination of outdoor
advertisements for aesthetic reasons, 60 could have been cited to illustrate an
expanding conception of the police power with respect to the protection of the
public against mere unsightliness; but to what extent are these public law
decisions in point on the question of whether similar conditions may be condemned by the courts as nuisances? This was one of the matters upon which
the concurring judge in Material Co. v. Barrack took issue with the majority,
asserting that decisions sustaining zoning or building restrictions as a valid
exercise of power by the legislative branch of the government, directly elected
by the people, have nothing to do with the law of nuisance as applied by a
court. It is submitted, however, that upon analysis these public law decisions
do have a substantial bearing on the question of whether conditions offensive
to aesthetic sensibilities constitute a nuisance.
In the leading decision on this branch of the police power, General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works, 6' it was squarely held
1128 Kan. 554, 278 Pac. 757 (1929).
0272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114, 54 A. L. R. 1016 (1926).

6OGeneral Outdoor Advertising Co. Inc. et al. v. Department of Public Works, 289
Mass. 149, 193 N. E. 799, appeals dismissed on motion of appellants, 56 Sup. Ct. 495-96
(1935) and cases cited in Gardner, The Massachusetts Billboard Decision (1936) 49
HAmv. L. Rav. 869, 883-886.
61289 Mass. 149, 193 N. E. 799, appeal dismissed, 297 U. S. 725, 56 Sup. Ct. 495 (1935).
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that no federal or state constitutional rights were violated by the refusal by
the State Department of Public Works "solely on grounds of fitness and
taste" to allow the continued operation of an electric illuminated advertisement facing Boston Common from the roof of an office building near the
State House. 6 2 The sign, a large steel structure displaying the trade name
of an automobile, had been constructed at a cost of approximately thirty-five
thousand dollars, after the owner had obtained the requisite permit, which
under existing statutes and regulations expired at the end of the year,
unless sooner revoked. An application for a renewal of the permit was denied, after a public hearing, because of objections by various civic associations
and sociefies, and by residents in the vicinity.
It is significant that the structure which was thus eliminated in order to
preserve the beauty of public buildings and natural scenery was not appropriated by the state under the power of eminent domain, with compensation
to the owner, but was removed without recompense under the police power.
Under that power, as stated by Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v.
Alger,6 3 the owner of property is restrained "not because the public have
occasion to make the like use of the property, or to take any benefit or profit
to themselves from it, but because it is a noxious use, contrary to the maxim
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. It is not an appropriation of the property
to a public use, but a restraint of an injurious private use by the owner, and
is, therefore, not within the principle of property taken under the right
of eminent domain." It, therefore, is essential, if interference with the use of
private property without compensation is to remain clear of constitutional
prohibitions against the deprivation of property without due process of law,
that the use interfered with be noxious and unreasonable. The use must
violate the same maxim which is so often employed in the definition of a
common law nuisance-sic ittere tuo ut alienum non laedas.64 That the courts
in fact regard the police power question as closely akin to that of what
constitutes a nuisance is shown by their use of analogies from the law of
nuisance to support decisions as to the constitutionality of building regulations and zoning ordinances. 65
'The Department was acting pursuant to statutes passed under Article 50 of Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, ratified 1918, reading, "Advertising on public
ways, in public places, and on private property may be regulated by law".
'7 Cush. 53, 86 (Mass. 1851).
'See Ross v. Butler, 19 N. J. Eq. 294, 298, 97 Am. Dec. 654, 657 (1868); JoycE,
NUISANCES (1906) § 11; HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 182.
'Thus in General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Dep't of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149,
183, 193 N. E. 799, 814-15 (1935) the court cites such decisions as Stodder v. Rosen
Talking Machine Co., 241 Mass. 245, 135 N. E. 251 (1922) enjoining a talking machine
as a nuisance, and Shelburne, Inc. v. Crossan Corp., 95 N. J. Eq. 188, 122 Atl. 749
(1923) enjoining colored lights which shone into complainant's hotel after midnight.
And in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 387-88, 47 Sup. Ct. 114, 118 (1926)
the court states: " . . . in solving doubts, the maxim 'sic utere hWo it alienug, non
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In General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works the
court indicates clearly that the use of property for the sign involved is
noxious. It is stated that the main feature of the right asserted by the Advertising Company is "the superadded claim to use private land as a vantage
ground from which to obtrude upon all of the public travelling the highways,
whether indifferent, reluctant, hostile, or interested, an inescapable propaganda"-a claim which the court definitely rejects, adding later on that the
regulation sustained "is not a mere matter of banishing that which in appearance is disagreeable to some. It is protection against intrusion by foisting the
words and emblems of signs and billboards upon the mass of the public
against their desires."0' 6 Evidently the court considers that the sign is or
comes close to being a public nuisance, 67 and it seems clear in this case that
the nuisance consisted only in the unaesthetic effect of the structure, impairing the beauty of the Common. There was no indication that the sign, situated at the top of an office building, would serve as a screen for refuse, or as
a shield for loiterers or criminals, nor was there any indication that it con68
stituted a fire hazard, or distracted the attention of motorists from the road.
60
In another public law case, State ex rel. Civillo v. New Orleans, sustaining
the exclusion of a Piggly-Wiggly store from a residential area, the court relies even more explicitly on the conception of nuisance to support its decision,
stating:
laedas' which lies at the foundation of so much of the common law of nuisances, ordinarily will furnish a fairly helpful clew. And the law of nuisances, likewise, may be
consulted, not for the purpose of controlling, but for the helpful aid of its analogies in
the process of ascertaining the scope of the power."
"289 Mass. 149, 169, 182, 193 N. E. 799, 808, 814 (1935).
"A nuisance is said to be public if it annoys the public generally. Unless there is also
some special injury to an individual, the only remedy is by a criminal prosecution on
behalf of the public. If a private individual suffers particular damage, apart from the
common injury, he may bring a private action for an injunction or damages. JoYcE,
NUISANCES (1906) §§ 13-14; HARPER, ToRTs (1933) §§ 179, 194.
"It should be observed that many decisions permitting the elimination or regulation
of billboards as a valid exercise of the police power, including decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, have emphasized considerations of safety, morality, and decency
to the exclusion of aesthetic considerations. See Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U. S. 526,
529, 37 Sup. Ct. 190, 191 (1917). But cf. St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis,
249 U. S. 269, 39 Sup. Ct. 274 (1919) where a prohibition of billboards in residential
areas was sustained even though it was admitted on demurrer that the billboards in
question were fireproof and sanitary, and had never been complained of by city officials
as detrimental to public health or morals. The Court conceded that, "Possibly one or

two details, especially the requirement of conformity to the building line, have aesthetic
considerations in view more obviously than anything else." In the case of Perlmutter

et al. v. Greene et al., 259 N. Y. 327, 182 N. E. 5 (1932) it was held that the state
superintendent of public works could erect on highway property a screen to obscure a

billboard at a dangerous curve in the road. While the court placed its decision primarily
on the ground that this was a reasonable safety measure to prevent distraction of the
motorist's attention from the road, it was added, "Beauty may not be queen, but she is
not an outcast beyond the pale of protection or respect. She may at least shelter herself
under the wing of safety, morality, or decency. . . . If, incidentally, the outlook from
by shutting off the view of the billboard, so much the better."
the road is improved
e9154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923).
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"An eyesore in the neighborhood of residences might be as much a
public nuisance, and as ruinous to property values in the neighborhood
as a disagreeable noise, or odor, or a menace to safety or
generally,
70
health."
It seems clear that these public law decisions, though they depend in part
on an expanding conception of the police power, also indicate that the conception of what constitutes a nuisance likewise is expanding to include unaesthetic sights.
To return for a moment to billboards it is interesting to note that in one
case it has been specifically stated that such a structure may constitute a
common-law nuisance. 71 The billboard in question which "would completely
obscure the vision for fourteen feet above the surface and would in a
limited way obscure the light and air", was being erected on a lot in a residential area at a point about ten feet from the street. The court granted an
injunction against the structure, mainly on the ground that it involved a
violation of a restrictive covenant in a deed, but added:
"The original and the amended bill each charged that this would be a
nuisance, and we are of the opinion that such a structure in a residential
72
neighborhood such as this was designed to be would be a nuisance."
The objection made in this case was simply that the billboard extended beyond an agreed building line, and it seems clear that unsightliness was the
only ground for considering it a nuisance. There was no indication that the
presence of the sign forward of the building line would increase the annoyance to the plaintiff by making conditions more unsanitary or more dangerous.
VIII
While zoning and building restrictions have diminished the problem of
protection against unsightliness to some extent, it is evident that numerous
cases continue to arise in which structures and conditions not in violation
of any restrictions are complained of by neighbors, and in many localities
conditions which are unsightly are not of frequent enough occurrence to
warrant legislative action. What then should be the attitude of the courts
toward such cases? Clearly it is undesirable to multiply restrictions upon the
free use of one's own land without substantial cause, but in some instances
the unsightliness objected to seems sufficient to interfere with the reasonable enjoyment by others of their property. Surely it can no longer be
alleged, since the decisions upholding the legislative restrictions of billboards
-154 La. 271, 284, 97 So. 440 (1923). Quoted with approval in Walnut & Quince St.
Corp. v. Miller et al., 303 Pa. 25, 34, 154 Atl. 29, 32 (1931). See also State ex rel.
v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 159, 196 N. W. 451, 455 (1923).
Carter
71
App. 553 (1919).
Woodburn et al. v. Russell, 213 Ill.
7213 Ill. App. 553, 557-58 (1919).
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to promote aesthetic ends, that the maxim de nvinimis non curat lex still
applies to unsightly conditions. Nor can it be said that such a condition is
innocuous, especially where the market value of neighboring property has
sharply declined. The principal objection to judicial intervention in such a
situation, the difficulty of establishing an objective standard, no doubt will
continue to constitute an obstacle to relief in many cases of alleged unsightliness, but at least within limited categories involving such conditions as
automobile wrecking establishments, junk yards, gas tanks, and the like, it
appears that the difficulties of determining the effect on the ordinary reasonable man are but little greater than in those branches of the law of nuisances,
dealing with contamination of the atmosphere by odors, or with disturbance
by noise. It has been seen that in some types of cases, such as those involving undertaking establishments, the present tendency is to emphasize the
purely mental injury to adjoining property owners, arising from the constant
sight of depressing occurrences. It also has appeared that if a landowner has
acted maliciously, a structure objectionable to sight and peace of mind only
will be enjoined. Unquestionably, the aesthetic sensibilities of the public
generally are increasing, and it is submitted that the time has now come
when the law of nuisance should definitely be expanded to protect, in many
cases, this growing interest in freedom from unsightliness. In the light
of such opinions as that expressed in Material Company v. Barrack, and of
other authorities which have been considered, it seems safe to predict that
there will be a noticeable development in this direction.

